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Jonathan Feld
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In 1742, William Shirley, governor of the Province of
Massachusetts Bay, gave a foreboding speech to the colony’s
House of Representatives. In it, he called for a law that would
prohibit impressment, the forced recruitment of merchant sailors into the Royal Navy. Shirley wanted the House to “pass an
Act for effectually preventing this evil Practice” that would otherwise create a “great charge and Trouble to this government
in providing Seamen for his Majesty’s Ships of War.”1 While
arguing against impressment on account of these difficulties,
he also cited the human cost incurred by “officers…impressing Men indiscriminately to the Great Grievance of particular
families,” pointing to impressment’s effects on Boston’s sailors.2
Shirley also asked for an “account of the progress made in the
Works at Castle William,” a fortification overlooking the entrance
to Boston Harbor, in the hopes that its construction would be
completed quickly.3 Little did he know, these issues would soon
be linked together in an imminent crisis in the colony.
Five years later, in the fall of 1747, Commodore Charles
Knowles of the Royal Navy made port in Boston as his squadron sailed from Louisbourg to his new command in the West
Indies. Prior to landing in New England, sailors deserted the
warships, forcing Knowles to gather supplies and recoup the
loss of able-bodied sailors. On November 17, falling back on
the Royal Navy’s practice of impressing sailors to fill ships’
crews, Knowles sent press gangs to comb merchant ships exiting
Boston Harbor and press men off Boston’s wharves. The gangs
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were supposed to locate the deserters, or at least press non-local
sailors, but they ultimately took men indiscriminately off the
docks, without regard to occupation or origin.4 In response, a
riot broke out in Boston that spiraled out of control as it raged
for three days. Assembled on the waterfront, the rioters engaged
in escalating displays of dissatisfaction. After Governor Shirley
unsuccessfully tried to calm the crowd, he was forced to flee to
the safety of Castle William, which, luckily, had been completed
in the five years since his aforementioned speech. Shortly thereafter, tensions continued to mount. Matters were brought to the
brink of extreme violence when Knowles began preparing to
bombard the town.5 He only relented after receiving a written
petition from Governor Shirley that asked him to desist and release the impressed men. After some of the men were released,
the rioting subsided and the mob dispersed.6

Sir Charles Knowles (1704–1777), the British Royal Navy
officer responsible for the outbreak of the eponymous
Knowles Riot in November 1747
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The relatively few sources that directly discuss the affair encompass a broad spectrum of social classes and political affiliations. For example, the mentality of the mob can be
assessed through depositions from the libel case of Knowles v.
Douglass (1748–49). While letters from officials such as Governor
Shirley and Commodore Knowles provide the point of view of
the political and naval elite who opposed the rioters, the historical account of then-Speaker Thomas Hutchinson reveals the
perspective of a more sympathetic faction of the political elite.7
Newspaper accounts, both in Boston and England, provided a
forum for voices across the political spectrum. The letters published in these accounts also give a unique outlook on the rioting.
Some writers, such as William Douglass, published pamphlets
that supported the opposition to impressment based solely on
economic interests.8 Others, such as Samuel Adams, presented
an emergent intellectual perspective that justified the riot as a
defense of the sailors’ “natural Right[s]” and their “Liberties.”9
Through these sources, a cross-section of Bostonian opinion
can be brought to light.
The Knowles Riot must be juxtaposed with the development of opposition to impressment across the British Atlantic,
but thus far many historians have interpreted the riot in a variety
of other contexts. Some, such as Jack Tager, understand it as an
example of social conflict, characterizing it as part of a series of
“acts of selective communal violence” perpetrated by “Boston’s
plebeians,” thereby drawing focus to the regional context.10 Similarly, Russell Bourne’s description of the affair as a “community
uprising” draws attention to the particularities of Boston’s society.11 Marxist historians, such as Peter Linebaugh and Marcus
Rediker, prefer to cast the Knowles Riot in terms of the “motley
crew’s resistance to slavery,” emphasizing the sailors’ unification
against political and military authority.12 Others synthesize these
two schools of thought. In particular, John Lax and William Pencak try to combine them in their analysis. On the one hand, they
are “especially convinced” by the Marxists’ focus on the “sailors’
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agency,” while on the other, they differentiate Boston from other
port cities and emphasize its local context.13 They also make their
own contribution, claiming that the mob included “people of all
classes,” implying more widespread participation than the proletarian analyses.14 This extant literature thus analyzes the Knowles
Riot through a variety of differing perspectives.
The context of other riots in the British Atlantic, however, exposes the similarities and innovations of the Knowles
Riot in a way that has been left largely unexplored. The long
tradition of impressment in the Royal Navy has been accompanied by an equally storied tradition of opposition. Impressment riots in other ports across the Atlantic can be used to bring
the defining features of the Knowles Riot into relief. Certainly,
this transatlantic context clarifies the mob’s actions in Boston
when they align with practices elsewhere, but it also exposes the
divergences between the Knowles Riot and other opposition.

In this caricature by famed printmaker James Gilray, a press gang is depicted
as taking a young man off the docks in London in 1779. Similar riots took
place across the British Atlantic throughout the eighteenth century.
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By understanding these divergences as a product of the Knowles
Riot’s local and temporal context, the nature of resistance in
the pre-Revolutionary American colonies can be distinguished.
The events of the Knowles Riot draw particular attention to the
interactions between Boston’s mob and its elite population. In
one sense, the mob’s objections parallel the grievances espoused
in other impressment riots. The sailors’ complaints mirror E.P.
Thompson’s description of the moral economy of British crowds,
which felt they were “defending traditional rights or customs”
during bread riots.15 Sailors across the British Atlantic would
protest when they felt that the traditional balance of power had
been disrupted and Boston’s mob proved to be no exception. In
another sense, the mob in Boston seems to have been composed
of a much broader segment of society, drawing on members of
the lower orders across the town. Similar nuances apply to Boston’s divided elite, with some wealthy Bostonians supporting the
government and a mercantile interest opposing impressment.
This cleavage was fairly typical of impressment riots. In Boston, however, it seems that a unique opposition arose among an
intellectual elite that justified the riots based on conceptions of
natural rights and liberties. Thompson notes that “men of education and address” often “endorsed the theories of the crowd”
in English bread riots.16 Though such views were occasionally
adopted by wealthy Englishmen, the intellectual elite in Boston
applied their arguments as justifications for a specific instance of
maritime opposition. The transatlantic context of the Knowles
Riot underscores similarities, such as the mob’s grievances and
an elite economic opposition to impressment, but also exposes
important distinctions, such as the mob’s diverse composition
and an emergent elite philosophical opposition to impressment.
The details of the Knowles Riot deserve more thorough
discussion to better contextualize its severity. As mentioned
briefly above, the riot started after Commodore Knowles began
pressing men on November 17, 1747. Depositions from the libel
suit Knowles v. Douglass reveal that he sent press gangs to take men
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from outbound ships.17 Though Knowles denied it, the same
depositions also claim that his men came onto the wharves of
Boston, pressing sailors and craftsmen into service. Both developments deviated from the Royal Navy’s convention of pressing
sailors from inbound ships.18 In response, rioters protested and
demanded the release of the impressed men. Some protesters
took Knowles’s officers as hostages with the hopes of ransoming
them in exchange. By November 19, the Massachusetts House
of Representatives ordered that “all other officers…[should] be
forthwith set at Liberty,” indicating this practice’s prevalence.19
Other tactics were also employed as protesters gathered around
the Governor’s House, provoking a violent confrontation between the mob and British officers.20 Though Shirley spoke to
calm the mob, he was unsuccessful and eventually fled to Castle
William. The governor’s flight was precipitated by Boston’s militia ignoring his call to put down the rioters.21 Historically, it was
not unusual for British militias to fail to put down riots. Thompson notes that British officers exhibited a “general reluctance to
employ military force” against rioters.22 In the Bostonian context, however, the militiamen seem to have been especially active
in the rioting.23 Though Shirley insisted that he did not “retire…
for Safety to [his] Person,” it seems that the size of the mob
forced him to seek refuge in the fortification.24 Even in these
first moments, the actions of the rioters escalated rapidly.
Over the ensuing days, the protesters engaged in several
further demonstrations. At one point they took a barge, mistakenly considered the Royal Navy’s property but actually owned
by a Scottish merchant, and burned it in the middle of Boston Common.25 Thomas Hutchinson’s History of the Province of
Massachusets-Bay [sic] uses this incident to discuss the mob’s organization. Though the mob initially intended to burn the barge in
front of the Governor’s House, it “diverted” the plan “from a
consideration of the danger of setting the town on fire,” demonstrating that it did not rage devoid of reason.26 At the same time,
however, the rioters were not afraid to engage in radical acts of
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protest. As the mob swelled into a group of thousands of disgruntled Bostonians drawn from an array of diverse professions,
its actions grew bolder.27 For example, the mob congregated near
the House of Representatives hoping to secure the release of the
pressed men. Governor Shirley wrote that when the rioters “surrounded the Court-House,” they offered “outrageous Insults on
the Authority of this Government.”28 After their unsuccessful
appeal, the members of the mob threw rocks at the recently
vacated building, shattering its windows.29 Matters finally came
to a head as the riot neared its conclusion, when Knowles positioned ships to bombard the city.30 Ultimately, Governor Shirley
convinced the commodore to release some of the pressed men,
at which point the rioting subsided. After Knowles dismissed
“most, if not all, of the inhabitants who had been impressed,”
the governor returned from Castle William.31 The imminent danger of escalating violence had been avoided through Governor
Shirley’s intervention.
Following Shirley’s return, the town and government
began making amends. As Hutchinson notes, an “uncommon
appearance of the militia of the town of Boston” gathered to
receive the governor.32 Newspapers reported that this was “the
most numerous and best Appearance of the Militia under Arms,
that has been known for divers Years past,” as the townspeople
tried to show their obedience to Governor Shirley.33 In the
following days, both the House of Representatives and members of the Boston Town Meeting issued several resolves that
condemned the rioting. The meeting’s resolution attempted to
blame the riot on “foreign Seamen, Servants, Negroes, and other
Persons of mean and vile Condition,” while asserting that “this
Town [has] the utmost Abhorrence of all such illegal criminal
Proceedings.”34 Meanwhile, Shirley publicly offered “One Hundred Pounds Old Tenor as a Reward” for those who informed
on the leaders of the mob while calling on the rioters to “surrender themselves up to Justice.”35 With this reconciliation of
the people and their government, the Knowles Riot came to a
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peaceful resolution.
The other necessary contextual component is the temporal and spatial background of transatlantic opposition to impressment in ports across the British Empire. Impressment was
one of the essential methods by which the Royal Navy manned
its warships. As historian N.A.M. Rodger discusses, the Royal
Navy relied on a “symbiosis of trade and sea,” in which merchant mariners were taken from merchant ships and ports to fill
warships’ crews with experienced sailors.36 In return, the Royal
Navy protected merchant ships on the high seas. Since sailors often preferred the higher wages paid for service aboard merchantmen, the military relied on compulsory service to crew its ships.37
This necessity was the impetus for Knowles’s press in 1747. Even
contemporary opponents of impressment recognized the need
for able-bodied sailors. Samuel Adams, one of impressment’s
staunchest colonial opponents, conceded that it would pose a
significant “difficulty…to man the Navy” without the “heavy…
Grievance” of impressment, indicating the common knowledge
that men could only be enticed to sail by force.38 Throughout
the Atlantic, it was understood that the only way for the Royal
Navy to crew the warships that would protect merchantmen was,
ironically, by stripping the merchant marine of its sailors through
impressment.
Though necessary, the practice was constrained by several customs that limited its scope and usage. By the mid-eighteenth century, impressment was becoming increasingly formally
regulated through a series of institutional changes in the Royal
Navy. In 1745, Parliament appointed regulating captains, a forerunner of the Seven Years’ War’s formalized Impress Service,
to uphold certain standards.39 Among these standards, the press
gangs were supposed to release men who were not sailors or
who held protections, a type of exemption.40 When these norms
were violated in Boston in 1747, it would have made sailors’
grievances even more acute and their reactions even more severe. To borrow from Thompson, it was often the “outrage to
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these moral assumptions” that sparked the sailors’ direct action.41
Impressment was also limited by a tradition that gangs required
warrants. Rodger is quick to point out that there was “no legal
necessity” for press gangs to receive these warrants from local
magistrates or officials.42 As Nicholas Rogers suggests, however,
warrants became a practical necessity for press gangs in the British Empire, as they dissuaded imposters and restrained the gangs
with a form of due process.43 In Boston, a controversy arose
over the legitimacy of the press gang’s warrant. According to
Governor Shirley, a member of the mob claimed that his “unjustifiable Impress Warrant” caused the rioting.44 Certainly, Shirley
did not improve matters when he responded that he had never
issued a warrant for the press gangs.45 Nonetheless, the conversation demonstrates the importance of warrants in the practice
of impressment. The traditional, legalistic restraints provided
a framework for restricting impressment in the mid-eighteenth
century British Empire.
A secondary set of limitations was centered on the
physical space in which impressment occurred. This type of restraint was related to the places and categories of ships subject
to impressment, such as the distinction between impressment
on the waterfront and aboard ships at sea. This distinction had
ramifications for the organization of opposition to the gangs.
For example, in Liverpool in 1759, the crew of the Golden Lion
opposed a press gang from HMS Vengeance that tried to board
the ship.46 The fighting that broke out was limited to the two
crews, with the Golden Lion’s men using harpoons to stave off the
warship’s gang.47 Conversely, a riot in Bristol that year featured
“three hundred seamen” who “gathered in a riotous manner”
in response to a press gang’s attempts to take sailors from the
wharves.48 In Boston, the dynamics of opposition would be influenced by Knowles’s gang taking men from ships in the harbor
and off the docks.
Similarly, there was a distinction between the categories
of ships that were subject to impressment. Merchant sailors and
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the Royal Navy tacitly understood that only inbound ships would
be pressed.49 As Denver Brunsman understands it, this implicit
rule was intended to prevent the practice of impressment from
undermining the strength of the empire. By only pressing inbound ships, the Royal Navy prevented itself from crippling
merchantmen before they left port.50 This practice provided the
ancillary benefit that all pressed sailors would have gained experience aboard the merchantmen. Linda Colley even suggests that
this experience was “indispensable for the operation of [British] naval power.”51 However, if the Royal Navy took men from
outbound ships, Brunsman notes that it would be “more likely…
to trigger violence.”52 Hutchinson’s complaint that Knowles’s
men took sailors off ships that were “outward bound as well as
others” can be understood within this context.53 These further
constraints on impressment were part of the shared expectations
of limitations on the press gangs’ practices.
In general, various forms of opposition to impressment
arose when the Royal Navy ignored the traditional limitations.
Surprisingly, as Rodger discusses, sailors generally accepted the
necessity of the practice and only resisted under special circumstances when its customs were violated.54 While some opponents
attempted to use the law, others resorted to political means or
even physical violence. Legal attempts to prohibit impressment
utilized legislation and lawsuits to defend sailors. For example, in
Broadfoot’s Case (1743), a sailor charged with murder for shooting
a member of a press gang was supported by the public as a protector of British liberties.55 Through a circumstantial technicality,
the jury was directed to bring in a verdict of manslaughter, while
Sir Michael Foster, the Recorder of Bristol, wrote an opinion
that supported the general legality of impressment.56 Still, legal
attempts to limit impressment achieved a victory in the North
American colonies through the Sixth of Anne Act of 1708. The
law stipulated that, barring deserters, no one in the American
colonies could be pressed by British officers.57 Though this law
was intended to promote commerce during Queen Anne’s War,
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its status became ambiguous at the conclusion of the conflict
in 1713. While it was unclear if the law was still valid, sailors
in North American ports endorsed a continuation of the ban,
but British officials dismissed it as a wartime measure.58 In the
midst of this legal ambiguity, Parliament passed another law in
1746 that prohibited impressment in the West Indies, which was
theoretically already protected by the Sixth of Anne.59 The passage of the new law implied that the Sixth of Anne’s universal
protections were no longer binding in the American colonies.
The uncertainty over impressment’s legality in North America
would become a flashpoint for the Knowles Riot, with contemporaries claiming that the West Indies’ exemption placed an undue burden on New England.60 These legal attempts constituted
one strain of broader transatlantic resistance.
Alternative types of resistance, such as political bargaining and physical violence, also emerged as practical forms of opposition to impressment. One such political response involved
the direct mediation of municipal governments. As Rodger
notes, both political and economic interests drove the desire to
mitigate the effects of impressment.61 In the British Isles, several
cities eventually coordinated with the Royal Navy to standardize and limit its impressment efforts. Bristol’s strong municipal
government reached an agreement with the navy around 1746
that would provide a fixed number of sailors in exchange for
an exemption from impressment ashore.62 On the other hand,
a comparatively weak local government in Liverpool could not
provide the same mediation, leading to more frequent clashes
between the navy and the mob.63 Though other historical and demographic factors affected the frequency of riots, this discrepancy shows the potential role of civil government in mediating
the tensions caused by impressment. Such clashes between the
navy and the mob provide a background to better understand
the Knowles Riot. In fact, as Nicholas Rogers documents, there
were “at least 55 affrays against the press gangs” over the duration of King George’s War.64 The character of the unrest can
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be generalized through selected examples. Though sympathetic
civilians often assisted the rioters, especially when non-sailors
were pressed, the sailors largely led resistance efforts. Usually,
when press gangs attempted to press men directly from merchant ships, only the sailors aboard the ship opposed them and
the affair seldom spread more widely. For example, when a gang
from HMS Winchelsea attempted to press the crew of the Tarleton
near Liverpool in 1744, the sailors directly resisted by firing on
the warship before ultimately disappearing into the town.65 On
the other hand, when press gangs went ashore, resistance usually spread across the maritime community. As expected, these
riots were substantially larger. In February 1762, for example,
hundreds of sailors, carpenters, and shipwrights gathered in Liverpool to protest the impressment of twenty-five sailors.66 The
previously mentioned 1759 riot in Bristol swelled to nearly three
hundred sailors who united against the press gang.67 Though
each impressment riot had unique characteristics, these examples
typify patterns of opposition in the British Empire.
The grievances of the mob in Boston can be related to
these examples of resistance to impressment. In fact, many of
the arguments made by members of the mob, or by elite writers
on their behalf, echo those made in prior instances of opposition. One particular type of grievance found in the historical
record is the sailors’ pragmatic objections. A frequent refrain of
the sailors is the incredible personal suffering imposed by the
press. The Knowles Riot even galvanized one writer to publicize
the “prodigious hardships we [sailors] daily suffer” as a result of
impressment.68 The deposition of Josiah Gains from Knowles v.
Douglass paints a startling picture of the harshness with which men
were pressed from their merchant ships. As Gains recounted, he
was “Surprized with four Barges & about 80 men well armed”
from the Royal Navy who suddenly began boarding his ship.69
Ultimately, the press gang informed Gains that they would “take
every Man Except the Captain out of the Ship,” stripping the
ship of its crew.70 Historians have corroborated similar accounts
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in which “whole crews…were taken, and outward-bound vessels were raided for men.”71 Several letters published in Boston’s
newspapers echoed the concerns of the pressed sailors. In a
letter printed by the Independent Advertiser, the author noted that
impressed men were often “Heads of Families” and called upon
his audience to recognize the “Hardships which must ensue
from” the “intolerable” impressment and “the Distresses which
must arise” from such a “Prodigious Depopulation,” both for
the community and individuals.72 Similarly, the author noted that
impressment creates a “Destruction of the Youth” not unlike
the “Destruction of the Spring,” emphasizing the negative consequences of depriving Boston of its young male population.73
The mob’s pragmatic grievances underscore the profound effects of impressment and align with developments in the Atlantic maritime world.
In addition to these practical arguments, the members
of the mob also produced several quasi-legal arguments that,
though specific to the Bostonian context, align with arguments
used elsewhere in the British Atlantic. Some of these complaints
related to the process of Knowles’s impressment. While the very
initial stages remain unclear, some sources report that the mob
was unhappy with a ruse played by Knowles. In England, the
Whitehall Evening Post reported that the “Insurrection at Boston
[was] occasioned” when Knowles tricked Boston’s sailors by “ordering a Schooner to be advertised to go [as] a Privateer on the
Spanish Main, for which they beat up for Volunteers” and then
“immediately impressed all the Men from the Merchant Ships
in the Harbour that were ready to go under his Convoy,” using
the ruse to fool Boston’s sailors.74 Supposedly “exasperated…
to such a Degree” by this deception, the people began to riot.75
Though this report omits several details when recounting the
rioting, it exemplifies some of the legalistic arguments that attempted to invalidate impressment.76
More broadly, Bostonian sailors produced quasi-legal
arguments that Knowles’s press had violated the traditions
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of impressment.77 As Joseph Ballard, a sailor in Commodore
Knowles’s squadron, acknowledged in his deposition, the mob
was allegedly “Occasioned by the Men of War’s Boats coming
up to Town.”78 This understanding implies that the mob was specifically agitated by Knowles’s press on the wharves. As seen in
other cases in the British Empire, the method of impressment,
land-based or ship-based, played a significant role in its acceptability in different ports. Similarly, another argument was made
regarding the types of ships that were accosted by Knowles’s
press gangs. As Josiah Gains mentioned in his deposition, he
told the gang that his vessel was “Outward bound” but they
only “Damned him & order’d him to go Immediately into their
boat.”79 Thomas Hutchinson also made note of the fact that the
gangs took men off ships that were “outward bound as well as
others.”80 This mention implies that, at the very least, the departure from tradition was noteworthy. The press gangs’ disregard
for this custom drew the ire of the mob and Boston’s general
population, especially once it was noticed by the sailors who
understood impressment’s implicit code of conduct. A related

Thomas Hutchinson (1711–1780) served as speaker of the General
Court from 1746 to 1749. His History of the Province of Massachusetts Bay
is a crucial source for understanding the Knowles Riot.
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allegation arose that an irregular assortment of people was taken.
Hutchinson notes that the press gangs also took “some ship carpenters’ apprentices and laboring land men.”81 In one case, “two
apprentices” who were accosted were able to avoid impressment
only after claiming that “they were about their Master’s business.”82 Jonathan Tarbox noted that he avoided impressment by
claiming that he was only a caulker, although others were not as
fortunate.83 Additionally, though specific to the North American
context, sailors tried to make the case that impressment in Boston was illegal or, at least, unfair. Due to the Sixth of Anne Act,
there was a lingering controversy about impressment’s legality in
the North American colonies, with British jurists claiming that
the law had expired and sailors concluding that its provisions
against impressment were still binding.84 Several letters published
in the local newspapers picked up similar arguments. In one case,
an anonymous author channeled the sailors’ concerns by writing
that, since Boston was “singled out from the rest of the King’s
Provinces” for these “Scenes of Depredation,” Knowles’s press
gang was committing an “Injustice.”85 Together, these types of
complaints and arguments, both practical and legal in nature,
represent the ways in which the Boston mob recapitulated the
anti-impressment arguments of sailors across the British Empire.
However, the transatlantic comparison also reveals how
Boston’s mob featured wider social participation that transcended maritime relationships and included members from across
Bostonian society. At the end of the riot, both the House of
Representatives and members of the Boston Town Meeting tried
to distance the population of Boston from the tumult. Even so,
as Brunsman argues, by offering such strong censure following the
riot, these bodies ironically imply how emphatically Bostonians
had united against impressment during the riot.86 Similarly, Lax
and Pencak suggest that the town was “appearing to suppress
a crowd it had in fact supported” by uniting in post-riot condemnation to ensure that “the town avoided Knowles’s guns.”87
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On November 19, the House of Representatives passed a resolve that “there has been…a tumultuous riotous Assembling of
Armed Seamen, Servants, Negroes and others in the Town of
Boston,” trying to shift blame from the citizens who participated
in the rioting to social outsiders and non-Bostonians.88 The Boston Town Meeting made a similar proclamation on December
17, calling the riot a product of “foreign Seamen,” further removing the maritime population from the city as a whole, while also
blaming “Servants, Negroes, and other Persons of mean and vile
Condition.”89 In the same resolve, members of the Boston Town
Meeting tried to prove their obedience by proclaiming their “utmost Abhorrence of all such illegal criminal Proceedings.”90 As
a supposed “Proof ” of the alleged innocence of the town and
that the “Mind of the Inhabitants of the Town” was against such
“Tumult and Disorders,” many newspapers proclaimed that “the
most numerous and best Appearance of the Militia” arose at the
end of the riot.91 Following the riot, Bostonian political organizations engaged in a deliberate attempt to distance the citizenry
from the proceedings.
These demonstrations were likely intended to prevent
potential retaliatory attacks on the city. After all, Governor Shirley had threatened an “infamous Reproach upon the Duty and
Loyalty of the Town” if they failed to prove their loyalty.92 This
threat of retribution clearly had a significant effect, to the extent
that even individuals tried to prevent harm from befalling the city
on account of the unrest. For example, Gershom Flagg, a sailor
in Knowles’s squadron, recalled telling the commodore that he
was “sorrey that the Innocent should suffer with the gilty” and
insisted that “no men of Distinction or of any free Hold ware
[sic] among the mob or Riot.”93 Although Flagg claimed to be
from the city’s North End, he clearly could have had no idea
about who was actually supporting the mob because of his service aboard the warships in the harbor. Nonetheless, Flagg had a
vested interest in convincing the commodore that the mob was
composed mainly of foreigners, sailors, and slaves, as did the
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other individuals and political bodies that were trying to protect
the city. By assigning blame to otherwise marginalized groups in
Bostonian society, many people and political institutions associated with the riots tried to spare Boston from retribution.
In fact, a closer examination of the rioting reveals that
the mob in the Knowles Riot was composed of a much broader
cross section of society than other impressment riots of the
period. While sailors may have initiated the unrest, it ultimately
included craftsmen and other Bostonians. The account given by
Thomas Hutchinson documents this broad support for the rioting. For example, Hutchinson wrote that in the early phases of
unrest “several thousand people assembled in King Street” in
protest.94 Though this estimate is not exact, any gathering of that
magnitude would be astounding since Boston had only approximately 16,382 residents in 1742.95 Hutchinson even explicitly
commented on the character of the forming mob. He recorded
that “men of all orders resented [the press],” indicating how
deeply the anti-impressment sentiment permeated Bostonian
society.96 The mob’s broad composition is further implied by its
choice of weapons. The “sticks, clubs, [and] pitchmops” used
during the unrest were not particularly maritime weapons, such
as cutlasses, pistols, or miscellaneous nautical equipment including marlinspikes.97 Governor Shirley’s letters reveal that he was
aware that the uproar was not limited to the city’s sailors. Shirley
wrote publicly that there was “Reason to apprehend that the
Insurrection was…encourag’d by some ill-minded inhabitants,
and persons of influence in the town,” signifying that he also believed that townspeople had joined in the rioting.98 Though there
were some supportive “Officers and Gentlemen of the Town,”
his retreat to Castle William implies that the affair was more serious and widespread than a mere maritime squabble.99 Other
notable figures echoed this sentiment, including Samuel Adams,
who wrote that “the People” were “running together for their
mutual Defence.”100 Even contemporary writers acknowledged
the significant participation of Boston’s non-sailor population.
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An indicator of the widespread nature of the upheaval
was the response of Boston’s militia, or rather, the lack thereof.
Shirley, when he fled to Castle William, noted that he could not
raise “a proper force for Suppressing this Insurrection” and that
he could not even defend the Governor’s House.101 Even more
directly, Shirley wrote that “the soldiers of the militia…[have]
refus’d and neglected to obey my Orders…to appear in Arms,”
indicating that the city militia, composed of Bostonians across
professions and social classes, could not be raised.102 This inability to raise the militia is telling. Certainly, it is possible that the militiamen refused to respond amid the chaos of the ongoing protests for a number of practical reasons, including fear of looming
conflict with fellow Bostonians.103 Given the descriptions of the
size and composition of the mob, however, it is likely that the
militia did not form because its members were, to some degree,
participants in the riot. The militia, intrinsically local in character,
likely would have had few sailors among its ranks. Therefore,
its refusal to muster on Governor Shirley’s orders suggests the
degree to which the non-sailor population joined the rioters.
On November 19, the colony’s executive council condemned
the ongoing “dangerous Insurrection of Seamen and others” in
Boston.104 This mention of the presence of “others” suggests
that non-sailor participation was significant enough to warrant
its inclusion in a description of the unrest. Distinguishing itself
from analogous contemporary maritime protests, the Knowles
Riot seemed to contain far more of these “other” participants
among the mob’s ranks.
In a more abstract sense, another key facet of the
Knowles Riot involved the role and nature of elite support for
the protests. In some ways, the role of social and political elites is
related to trends in other episodes of resistance to impressment.
For example, the opinions of Boston’s elite were not monolithic.
According to Thomas Hutchinson, “a number of gentlemen”
contacted Governor Shirley and assured him that “they would
stand by him” against the protesters.105 Although this group did
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not constitute enough men for Shirley to put down the riot, or
even enough for him to remain in the city, it shows that some
members of the upper classes opposed the rioters. Similarly,
Shirley himself noted that some “Officers and Gentlemen” continued to share in a sense of “Duty and Attachment to the King’s
Government.”106 Evidently, he knew that he retained the support
of some wealthy Bostonians. These gentlemen who supported
Shirley were likely concerned about economic consequences,
such as the potential property damage caused by the unrest. As
in other riots, the protesters were not completely supported by
all members of the upper classes.
Still, the arguments made by the mercantile elite in defense of the rioters echoed the economic arguments of elites in
other ports. Boston’s merchants, as in seaports across the British
Empire, viewed impressment as a depredation on shipping that
left vessels without essential manpower. Such losses manifested
themselves in various ways. In one case, as Josiah Gains mentioned in his deposition, a ship was left adrift in Boston Harbor without its crew after being accosted by a press gang from
Knowles’s squadron. The abandoned ship then encountered
“an Exceeding hard Gale of Wind” that “drove her Ashoar,”
causing “great damage” to the ship and her cargo.107 The concern about impressment’s immediate negative consequences on
property was a primary motivator of the merchant elite’s opposition. Those who stood to lose monetarily often made appeals on behalf of their property. John Cathcart, master of a
ship in Boston Harbor, wrote directly to Governor Shirley in
the hopes of obtaining some sort of “account of the measures
for the relief of his distressed ship,” trying to receive redress for
the havoc wreaked by impressment.108 In the long-term, Boston’s merchants feared even more extreme damages. As a letter published in the Independent Advertiser noted, the entire town
would eventually suffer from “the great Injury…to the Plantations by being drained of their people,” indicating the severity
of the manpower shortage caused by the frequent impressment
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of working-age men.109 These economic concerns explain the
rationale behind the mercantile elite’s support for the rioters.
The most prominent display of the sentiments of
Boston’s economic elite towards the rioters and the mercantile
support for the mob’s protests is found in the work of William
Douglass. Douglass was a distinguished physician with varied
interests, including law, medicine, botany, and astronomy, but
his vehement opposition to impressment was published in his
Summary, Historical and Political, of the First Planting, Progressive
Improvements, and Present State of the British Settlements in NorthAmerica.110 Shortly after the Knowles Riot, sections of Douglass’s work were published serially in Boston’s newspapers. He
used the typical mercantile arguments to respond to Knowles’s
actions. Douglass’s criticism of Knowles’s conduct and character
was so severe that, as mentioned above, Knowles initiated the
libel suit of Knowles v. Douglass.111 Douglass personally critiqued
Knowles in his rebuke, but he primarily attacked impressment’s
harmful economic effects. Brunsman suggests that the critique
was based on disdain for the rioting caused by impressment but,
in reality, the argument was largely economic.112 Douglass noted
that impressment “hinders” both the “trade and navigation”
of the places from which sailors are taken.113 In this analysis,
opposition to impressment derives from a practical economic
claim. Elsewhere, Douglass explained the longstanding “Dispute between the Admiralty and the Trade” as a rift between
the interests of the merchants and their protectors.114 While the
Royal Navy grumbled that merchants lured sailors into desertion, merchants complained about the hardships imposed by
impressment.115 Douglass ultimately supported the merchants,
arguing that impressment was directly linked to the “distressing
of trade” in Boston.116 Through his work on the development of
the British colonies in North America, William Douglass offered
the typical mercantile elite argument against impressment by
placing the town’s economic interest against the military’s need
for manpower.
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In tandem with the anti-impressment economic response
of Boston’s mercantile elite, the Knowles Riot also uniquely fostered an intellectual elite opposition. Unlike in other impressment
riots, the Knowles Riot provoked the emergence of a coherent
ideological argument among intellectuals against impressment
predicated on the sailors’ liberties and natural rights. The foundations of these ideological arguments were not entirely novel.
As Rodger writes, plans for compulsory service in the military
were often “rejected as incompatible with English liberties.”117
Similarly, Massachusetts’s House of Representatives had already
written as early as 1720 that impressment was a violation of the
“common Liberty of the Subject.”118 It was only a small, logical
step to extend this opposition to schemes that took sailors off
the waterfront and merchant ships and forced them to serve in
the Royal Navy. The specific innovation in Boston in 1747 was
the rapid and widespread application of these ideas as a reaction to a specific instance of impressment. A letter published on
December 28 justified the rioting by saying that, though people
must submit to political authorities that “govern…for the good
of the Society,” they also have an obligation to “oppose them, if
they design their Ruin or Destruction.”119 In the same letter, the
author made a claim to the “Liberties of Englishmen” that would
be echoed several decades later in the American Revolution.120
By staking this claim to liberties, the author took a frequent argument of English mobs and tied it to American colonial unrest. A
later anonymous pamphlet, entitled Plain Truth, also supported a
“glorious” defense of “our…most precious Liberty and Property,”
comparing the situation to the Glorious Revolution.121 By adapting preexisting notions of liberty and natural rights to the context of Boston’s unrest, these writers tried to justify the mob’s
actions.
A final iteration of this ideological argument in contemporary newspapers can be found in the Independent Advertiser,
which was founded by Samuel Adams in the aftermath of the
Knowles Riot. In its inaugural issue on January 4, 1748, the paper
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established a purpose of “defend[ing] the Rights and Liberties
of Mankind…to improve the Trade, the Manufactures, and Husbandry of the Country.”122 In so doing, the newspaper implicitly
joined the traditional economic arguments against impressment,
embodied as issues of trade, manufactures, and husbandry, with
the language of rights and liberties. In pursuing this mission, the
Independent Advertiser continued to advocate the mob’s right to
protest. Later on, the paper published a letter that defended the
mob for exercising “the natural right which every man has…to
repel those Mischiefs [of the press gangs]” by participating in the
tumult.123 It argued that, in the absence of a “sufficient Remedy,”
the rioters “have a natural Right to defend themselves,” as in
the case of Knowles’s actions.124 The same letter began with an
appropriate quote from Cicero’s Pro Milone, the speech given in
defense of Titus Annius Milo in 52 BCE. The section quoted,
in translation, dictates that people should be allowed to “repel
all violence…from their persons, from their liberties, and from
their lives,” in which case, “you cannot decide this action to have
been wrong.”125 This author deliberately drew upon the storied
history of the Roman Republic to justify the mob’s actions. In
the unique context of Boston’s Knowles Riot, these ideological arguments applied the preexisting language of the rights and
liberties of sailors in order to justify the mob’s actions.
This argument in favor of the liberties and rights of the
sailors found a surprisingly sympathetic response from Massachusetts Bay’s political bodies. On two occasions, these institutions acknowledged the rights-based grievances of the victims
of Knowles’s press. Following the riot, as discussed above, members of the Town Meeting tried to shift the blame for the unrest
towards marginalized members of the society, such as slaves and
foreign sailors. They published their proceedings in the hopes
of appealing to Governor Shirley. By and large, these proceedings served this purpose. However, they also noted that their
response was decided “notwithstanding…that the Rights and
Privileges of the Town had been invaded by the unwarrantable
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Impress that had been made of several of their Inhabitants,”
thereby adopting the language of the mob’s intellectual supporters.126 Though this acknowledgment did not lend direct support
to the rioters in the aftermath of the tumult, it demonstrates
the argument’s influence. Similarly, the House of Representatives
partially recognized that the government had violated individuals’
rights. On November 19, the House resolved that it would exert
itself in “all Ways and Means Possible, in redressing such grievances as his Majesty’s subjects are and have been under,” thereby
acknowledging the legitimacy of the citizenry’s complaints.127 In
these instances, the government seems to have partially accepted
the claim that impressment impinged on Bostonians’ liberties.
Much like with the economic arguments, the rights-based
intellectual arguments are best embodied by the work of a young
Boston lawyer, in this case, Samuel Adams. Before becoming a
leading figure of Boston’s mob and founding groups such as
the Loyal Nine and the Sons of Liberty, Adams was a twentyfive-year-old lawyer who had just completed a dissertation on
natural rights at Harvard in the years leading up to the Knowles
Riot.128 In 1748, Adams started a newspaper called the Independent
Advertiser. As briefly mentioned, the paper argued against impressment by defending the rights and liberties of the sailors and
citizens of Boston. In a separate pamphlet, Adams articulated
the language and philosophy that animated his opposition. Under the pseudonym of Amicus Patriae, “A Friend of Our Country,” Adams raged against the press gang’s conduct as an “Insult
upon our Liberties.”129 Specifically, though he acknowledged that
the “impressing of Seamen…has been long in Practice,” he rejected the notion that it had the “Force of Law.”130 Adams also
synthesized some of the more conventional arguments against
impressment with his novel approach. He incorporated many
of the concerns of the merchant elite, decrying the damaging
effects on trade and commerce. He also adopted many of the
mob’s complaints, citing the impact of taking men from “their
Families and Friends.”131 As a consequence of including these
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While publishing the Independent Advertiser and writing under the pseudonym
Amicus Patriae, Samuel Adams (1722–1803) articulated a natural rights-based
opposition to impressment in the aftermath of the Knowles Riot.

types of arguments, his own natural rights-based critique of
impressment is extended as a rather subtle addition to his argument. Nonetheless, Adams distinguished his own strain of oppositional critique by adopting the language of natural rights and
characterizing Knowles’s actions as a “lawless Attack upon our
Liberty.”132 In this understanding, though he condemned some
of the rioting, the mob could be justified as a body acting in
defense of its natural rights. Adams’s argument, typical of works
that emphasized rights and liberties, represents the core of an
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emergent intellectual criticism of impressment offered by nonmerchant Bostonians.
Interestingly, these two elite perspectives, though united
in their conclusions, often disagreed, with some of these conflicts spilling onto the pages of Boston’s newspapers. Though
these emergent schools of thought may have agreed in principle
in their opposition to impressment, their motives varied. On
December 21, 1747, William Douglass published an excerpt of
his work in the Boston Evening Post. In it, he wrote that “the least
Appearance of a Mob (so called from Mobile Vulgus) ought to be
suppressed, even where their Intention in any particular Affair is
of itself very good; because they become Nurseries for dangerous Tumults.”133 In short, his statement epitomized a merchant’s
general sentiments towards the rioters. Though the mob was
agitating for the end of impressment, which benefited the merchants, it is not surprising that these wealthy businessmen were
uncomfortable with civil disturbances perpetrated by the lower
orders. In response, an argument published in the Independent
Advertiser on February 8, 1748, roundly condemned Douglass.
There, the author began by noting that Douglass had “justly
observed in another place the great Injury which must accrue
to the Plantations by being drained of their people,” thereby
following in Adams’s example by acknowledging the mercantile
opposition to impressment.134 However, he went on to denounce
Douglass’s characterization of the mob and his call for greater
punishment of rioters, arguing that this “Suggestion” would be
“so unnecessary, so cruel and unjust” that it would become a
“Scandal upon the Character of the Country.”135 Clearly, those
with economic objections and those with philosophical qualms
had similar goals, but the two groups diverged on their opinions
of the rioting itself.
While this conflict poses an interesting topic for further
study, its importance for this analysis is to demonstrate that even
those in Boston’s higher society who detested impressment did
not necessarily agree about the implications of their opposition.
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As in impressment riots elsewhere, the arguments made by merchants mainly supported the status quo by defending their economic interests while condemning the social unrest caused by the
protesters. However, the application of rights-based ideological
arguments by intellectuals in opposition to a specific episode of
impressment represented a unique feature of Boston’s Knowles
Riot. In fact, this conflict heightens the distinction between the
two competing elite arguments against impressment. By means
of this separation, the novelty of Adams’s philosophical argument becomes an even more apparent departure from prior
perspectives. Though the arguments employed by these groups
often overlapped, their fundamental disagreement that has
been preserved on the pages of Boston’s newspapers exposed
the clash between the traditional mercantile arguments and the
emergent rights-based philosophical response of Bostonians
such as Samuel Adams.
Broadly speaking, several continuities demonstrate how
the Knowles Riot was influenced by prior unrest. The grievances
expressed by the mob were focused largely on the human impact
of being pressed into service, and the mercantile elite support
of their opposition, on the basis of its effects on business, find
clear parallels across riots in British ports such as Liverpool and
Bristol. The Boston mob, however, must be distinguished for the
widespread severity and broad implications of the Knowles Riot.
This understanding should not minimize the support received
by sailors in other port cities. Rather, it emphasizes the mass
participation achieved in Boston that was made possible by the
linkages between Bostonian life and the maritime professions.
Though these linkages were not necessarily weaker in other maritime communities, these connections were apparently leveraged
to garner broader support for sailors’ protests in Boston. Otherwise, it would have been impossible for the Knowles Riot to
escalate into a protest of “several thousand people,” as Thomas
Hutchinson wrote, or, at the very least, the Boston militia might
have mustered under Governor Shirley’s orders.136 Similarly, the
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emergent intellectual opinion in response to the press in 1747
presents a unique approach towards opposition. As noted before,
the association between natural rights and impressment was not
entirely novel. Through the writings of Adams and others, however, this language was operationalized in defense of a specific
riot, providing intellectual ammunition to oppose impressment
in practical terms. These writings complicate traditional assumptions about pre-Revolutionary mob actions in the American
colonies. In particular, it challenges Bernard Bailyn’s claim that
riots in the American colonies before 1765 were “ideologically
inert.”137 While the Knowles Riot certainly borrowed from other
impressment riots, it also presented a unique case of widespread
communal upheaval tied to a philosophical claim of natural
rights and liberties.
The Knowles Riot was neither the first nor the last impressment riot in the British Empire. There is immense value
in acknowledging and understanding the Knowles Riot in this
context. The sailors and their fellow Bostonians who engaged
in this form of mass protest would have been aware of prior
unrest in the city, such as the Wager Incident of 1745, in which
two merchant sailors were murdered by press gangs.138 Similarly,
this instance of crowd action would inform and influence developments across the Atlantic. For example, when whalers in Liverpool in 1759 took hostages from a press gang, they drew on a
vernacular of opposition that was utilized in the Knowles Riot.139
At the same time, comparison with the transatlantic history of
impressment riots shows that the Knowles Riot was, in many
ways, unique. To some degree, historians such as Russell Bourne
are correct in analyzing the riot in the context of Boston’s communal history.140 The communal participation in Boston’s riot
paints a portrait of a deeply interconnected community with its
nexus at the waterfront. A deeper understanding of the actions
of sailors and the interconnection of ideas across the Atlantic
maritime environment reveals how the Knowles Riot was woven
into a web of broader opposition to impressment in the British
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Empire. Though it is tempting to understand the Knowles Riot
as the opening salvo in a barrage of Bostonian unrest that was
followed by episodes of resistance in Boston Common and
Boston Harbor, it is better understood as a startling broadside
in a conflict that stretched across the North American colonies,
the Caribbean, and the British Isles throughout the eighteenth
century.
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